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Abstract 
This paper explores vendor selection decisions where competing vendors offer similar products with 
multiple non-price attributes.  Traditional “multi-attribute auctions” such as the USAF Air Tanker 
competition include prices alongside other attributes in vendor proposals.  Buyers generally select 
winning bidders using a weighted average of price and non-price attributes.  A different approach is 
recommended here: to embed vendor prices directly in the buyer’s budget constraint.  A first step is to 
conduct a simple multi-attribute auction with a fixed budget.  The government buyer only evaluates 
vendor proposals that satisfy the budget constraint, choosing the proposal (non-price attribute bundle) 
which offers the greatest “value for money” (i.e., budget).  The next step is to address budget 





results, including that the traditional practice, and classroom technique, of eliminating dominated 
alternatives can lead to sub-optimal decisions.  Improving public procurement decisions requires 
forecasting a range of future budgets, and soliciting information from vendors that allows procurement 
alternatives to be defined as functions of the value offered by each vendor over a range of budgets, 
rather than as a single point in budget-value (cost-effectiveness) space.  Under more realistic budget 
scenarios, different vendor selection decisions will occur that benefit both troops and taxpayers.  
Background and Introduction 
This paper offers a model to guide public procurement decisions in severely 
constrained budget environments.  The global financial crisis swiftly evolved into a debt 
crisis that increasingly constrains government spending.  The US is not immune.  The 
federal debt, at roughly 80% of GDP and rising, is set to seriously constrain discretionary 
federal spending.  Today, mandatory expenditures on Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, 
Interest on the Debt, etc., make up over 60% of the federal budget, and continue to grow.  
By far the largest component of the corresponding, and shrinking, discretionary budget 
(more than half) is spent on national defense.  The challenge then, is to develop an 
approach to accommodate the future budget uncertainties that will increasingly face federal 
agencies, and in particular, the US Department of Defense (DoD).  
This paper explores vendor selection decisions where competing vendors offer 
similar products (computers, logistics packages, weapon systems, etc.) that incorporate 
multiple non-price attributes.  In most multi-attribute auctions, vendor prices are included 
alongside other attributes as part of the vendor’s proposal.  Along with political 
considerations, a weighted average of price and non-price attributes is generally used by 
governments to help select the winning bidder.  The approach recommended here is 
different.  In the spirit of “Cost as an Independent Variable” (CAIV), the proposal is to 
incorporate vendor prices in the buyer’s budget constraint.  
A first step is to conduct a simple multi-attribute auction with a fixed budget (point 
estimate) for the program (product or service).  In this case, the government buyer chooses 
from a set of vendors that each submit their best offers—non-price attribute bundles that fall 
within the specified budget.  The next step is to address the political realities of budget 
uncertainty.  This requires an expansion of the model that incorporates a range of possible 
budgets (e.g., optimistic, pessimistic, and most likely).  This leads to several interesting 
results.  Perhaps the most surprising is that the traditional practice, and classroom 
technique, of eliminating dominated alternatives can easily lead to sub-optimal decisions.  
Finally, the model is generalized to capture budget uncertainty through the 
specification of a probability distribution (density function) over the range of possible 
budgets.  The dual fundamental insights of this paper are that public procurement decisions 
can be improved if: i) interval estimates (ranges) of future budgets (and corresponding 
probability distributions) are forecasted, and ii) information from vendors is solicited that 
allows procurement alternatives to be defined as a function of value (non-price attributes) 
over a range of possible budgets, rather than as a single point in budget-value (cost-
effectiveness) space.  
Over the next five years, the US Department of Defense (DoD) plans to spend more 
than $357 billion on the development and procurement of major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs).  According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2009), the 
DoD’s goal is to “achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems that are affordable” [emphasis 





proposed that extends traditional price-only auctions to one in which competition takes place 
exclusively over specific bundles of desired non-price attributes or characteristics. 
In this model, prices/costs do not appear in the buyer’s value function.  Instead, in 
the spirit of "cost as an independent variable" (CAIV), prices/costs are incorporated in the 
buyer’s affordability constraint.  Larsen (2007) provides the following explanation of CAIV: 
All acquisition programs/issues consist of three fundamental elements: cost, 
performance and schedule.  Under CAIV, performance and schedule are considered 
a function of cost.  Cost and affordability should be a driving force not an output after 
potential solutions are established. 
Michael and Becker (1973) and others also discuss the importance of separating prices from 
multi-attribute measures of value.  This is especially important for agencies that face budget 
uncertainty.  
For example, given the growing pressure on defense budgets from expanding 
federal deficits, the military’s “bow wave” of planned procurement contracts and operating 
cost commitments is not affordable, and has recently threatened several MDAPs. [e.g., the 
Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) and the Air Force Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program]  
An important lesson is that different optimal vendor selections likely would have taken place 
under more realistic budget scenarios, and that this would have benefited both troops and 
taxpayers.  
This paper explores vendor “performance competition” under alternative budget 
scenarios. Given a target budget for the program (e.g., computers, vehicles, weapons, 
logistics packages, etc.), competing vendors generate multi-attribute (performance) offers 
based on their individual costs, technology, productivity, production processes, supply 
chains, etc.  Each vendor (seller/bidder) is provided the same budget authority guidance 
from the procurement agency’s projected funding forecast (a point estimate).  Vendors 
respond by offering their best possible non-price attribute bundles.  
In the model, a vendor's proposal (offer) depends on the buyer's budget, and the 
individual vendor's costs of supplying each attribute along with the production technology 
they have available to combine those attributes.  Competition between vendors takes place 
exclusively over product performance (collections of non-price attributes) for a given budget.  
The government buyer’s value function facilitates the evaluation vendor proposals (bundles 
of non-price attributes) and the selection of a winner.1 
                                                
1 Consider a simple example. Suppose a dozen impact resistant notebook computers are required for 
a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) heading to Afghanistan. The team believes the most likely 
budget available for these computers will be $20,000, and it reveals this to the competing vendors. 
For this particular budget, each vendor offers a different combination of components, attributes and 
quality characteristics based on its technology, its capital and labor productivity, and the fixed and 
variable costs embedded in its supply chains. Given the different sets of a dozen computers offered 
by the each vendor, the team then selects the vendor that offers the best value (mix of attributes) for 
their budget, or the one that maximizes their private value function. With the funding uncertainty 
inherent in defense programs, this paper suggests that vendors be asked to provide offers for more 
than one budget level (say an optimistic budget of $25,000 and a pessimistic budget of only $15,000). 
In general, the recommendation is that each competing vendor’s proposal be re-defined as a function 
of the bundle of multiple (non-price) attributes they can offer over the range of possible budget levels 





A straightforward extension is to allow the buyer to offer a range of possible budgets. 
However, this involves a more complex solicitation, inviting proposals from different vendors 
for each possible budget.  The significant benefit is that it provides a more robust view of a 
vendor’s ability to provide performance.  The “expansion path” generated for each vendor 
shows how that vendor’s proposal changes as the budget increases or decreases.  
     This approach can be thought of as a strategic choice of auction mechanism for a 
buyer when possible overall budget authorities for the program can only be 
estimated/forecasted, and the products/services are highly differentiated and complex.  It 
combines the competitive advantages of auctions with the flexibility of a decision based on 
multiple attributes of the product.   
In our formulation, both seller and buyer suffer from imperfect and asymmetric 
information.  The seller does not know the relative weights the buyer assigns to the 
attributes. Meanwhile, the buyer does not know the sellers' costs of producing a particular 
attribute, nor the technology (production functions) that combines those attributes into the 
desired products. Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) explain this asymmetry in the case of a 
seller’s private information:  "[S]eller costs can be expected to depend on [the] local 
manufacturing base and sellers can be expected to be well informed about the cost of 
(upstream) raw materials."   
Loerch, Koury, and Maxwell (1999) discuss a "Value Added Analysis" approach that 
is similar to ours in employing multi-attribute preferences in weapon systems acquisition 
decisions.  Our approach differs from theirs in that we incorporate the vendors' decision-
making explicitly into the model, and capture the issue of asymmetric information.   
Blondal (2005) discusses a two-stage2 bidding process similar to ours, in which the 
procuring agency issues a general request, and then later issues a more detailed request 
based on the responses received.  The US Federal Acquisition Regulations (2005) provide 
guidance in subpart 14.5 on another two-step process for government agencies: 
Step one consists of the request for, submission, evaluation, and (if necessary) 
discussion of a technical proposal.  No pricing is involved.  Step two involves the 
submission of sealed price bids by those who submitted acceptable technical 
proposals in step one.  Invitations for bids shall be issued only to those offerors 
submitting acceptable technical proposals in step one.  An objective is to permit the 
development of a sufficiently descriptive and not unduly restrictive statement of the 
Government's requirements especially useful for complex items. 
The approach proposed in this paper is similar, but differs from this two-step bidding process 
in that the competition is over non-price attributes, and the price is captured in the budget 
authority (or affordability) constraint. 
 
Much of the multi-attribute auction literature (Che, 1993; Beil & Wein, 2003; and 
Parkes & Kalagnanam, 2005; etc.) either implicitly or explicitly includes price alongside non-
                                                
2Blondal defines a "stage" differently than we do in this paper.  We use the term to refer to a decision or set of 
decisions that depends only on exogenously given parameters and previous decisions.  For example, Blondal 
considers a government agency's solicitation and the vendor offers in response to be a single stage, whereas we 





price attributes in the buyer's (auctioneer's) value/utility function.3  While this approach is 
appropriate in some contexts, it can generate complications in evaluating alternative 
defense investments.  Unlike private sector decision makers that maximize profits 
(Revenues minus Costs), the government cannot simply subtract prices (or costs) from non-
price attributes and generate an equivalent “profitability” metric to evaluate alternative 
investment options.  
Interestingly, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a firm to maximize profits 
is for it to maximize the value of its output for the costs it incurs (or in the dual: to minimize 
the costs of producing its output).  Interpreting the firm’s costs as its budget, this 
corresponds to maximizing output for a given budget, and is analogous to our proposal for a 
government activity to maximize its value function (of non-price attributes) for a given 
affordability (budget) constraint.  In fact, the proposal is to promote an approach where 
government decision makers maximize their value function (over a set of non-price 
attributes) for a range of budgets they think they might be allocated, but that might not be 
revealed with certainty within the window of that decision process. 
However, historically (and even today) budgets for specific defense products and 
services were generated by the low cost (or best value) vendor among those responding 
with price quotes, for the requirements set by the military branches to support warfighters.  
Given current fiscal deficit projections that promise increasingly tighter budget constraints, it 
is not likely this approach will survive much longer.  Traditional “bottom-up” budgets 
historically generated by the military services in cooperation with vendors to purchase force 
requirements, are likely be subjected to greater top-down budget guidance.4  
Two widely cited pioneers in defense economics, Hitch and McKean (1967), 
advocate an approach similar to that proposed in this paper: To determine the “maximum 
effectiveness for a given budget” and to examine how each alternative fares for several 
different budget levels. 
The Model 
The model consists of three stages, illustrated in Figure 1. 
                                                
3Note that in defense procurement, value functions generate "measures of effectiveness" 
(MOEs). The term “MOE” is used in a few different ways.  It may describe a single-attribute value 
function, or a multi-attribute value function which might incorporate the whole objectives hierarchy, or 
only a portion of it.  For a detailed discussion of MOEs, see Sproles (2000). 
4 Some evidence of tighter fiscal guidance appears in the new emphasis on fiscally informed 
“Planning” that involves more up-front military investment trade-offs, and correspondingly stricter 
fiscal guidance to the Military Services, in DoD’s over-arching “Planning, Programming, Budgeting 






The Three-stage Procurement Model 
In the first Stage, the procurement agency (buyer) solicits offers from vendors 
(sellers), specifying a set of attributes A and a budget level B.  There are n vendors, each of 
whom responds in the second stage with a bid.  In this case, a “bid” is simply a set of non-
price attribute levels a vendor offers to produce for the budget, B.  We express vendor i's bid 
as [ ]1, ,i i imA a a= K  for 1, ,i n= K , where ija  is the level of attribute j offered by vendor i. In 
the third stage, the buyer's decision is to select a vendor, [1, ]i n∈ , and thus a set of attribute 
levels [ ]1, ,i i imA a a= K , that maximizes the “measure of effectiveness” (MOE), which we 
express as the value function ( )iV A . We assume ( )iV A  is an additive multi-attribute value 
function, though as we will observe later, our conclusions do not require ( )iV A  to be 
additive.  The use of additive multi-attribute value functions requires that preferential 
independence be satisfied (Dyer & Sarin, 1979; Kirkwood & Sarin, 1980)5.  We assume for 
simplicity that the single-attribute value functions are linear, and that attributes are 
                                                
5 See Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Kirkwood (1997) for further discussion of additive multiattribute value 






measured on the same scale6.  Thus, we will refer simply to ija  rather than using the 








V A w a
=
= ∑ ,                                  (1) 
 
where jw  is the weight the buyer places on attribute j.  We assume the buyer has an 
understanding of the range of attribute levels when determining the weights, and that these 
weights are private information to the buyer.  Asker and Cantillon (2007) refer to this as a 
“secret scoring rule.”  The final stage of the model is the application of (1) to the set of bids, 
and the selection of the vendor yielding the highest value. 
Given A and B, each vendor chooses an attribute bundle which meets the budget 
constraint revealed by the buyer.  A vendor has private information regarding production 
capabilities and costs, but must somehow form beliefs about the likelihood of a bid being 
accepted.  We facilitate formulation of these beliefs by having each vendor generate a "best 
guess" at the weights of the buyer's (additive) value function, which we can express 
as ( )1, ,i i imW w w= K .  We refer to this hypothetical value function as ( )iQ A .  A higher ( )iQ A  
indicates a greater probability with which the vendor believes the bid will be accepted.  Only 
the ordinal rankings imposed by this value function are relevant, since vendors in our model 
will simply choose the attribute bundle (s)he believes has the highest probability of being 
chosen. 








Q A w a
=
= ∑ , 1, ,j m= K  





TC c a B
=
= ≤∑ ,                                   (2) 
 
where the total cost iTC  is an additive function of the costs of firm i to produce each 
attribute level.  The total costs for a particular vendor of generating its (non-price attribute 
bundle) offer cannot exceed B.   
The individual attribute cost functions are given by ( )ij ijc a , and each one is 
increasing in aij.  Because the objective function of (2) is linear, a unique solution exists, 
provided that ( )ij ijc a  is strictly convex for 1, ,j m= K .  This is reasonable, since it simply 
corresponds to decreasing returns to scale from investment in improving an attribute level. 
For purposes of illustration and ease of exposition, the remainder of the study 
focuses on only two vendors, and two (non-price) attributes measured on the same scale.  
                                                
6The structure of the single-attribute value functions is not germane to the purpose of this paper.  The same 
results can be obtained without these assumptions, but we believe that some of the subsequent examples will be 
more illustrative when shown in attribute space rather than value space.  Some clarity might be provided by 





Assuming each vendor has a different technology (production process) to combine the two 
attributes and faces different attribute cost functions, the Lagrangian function for the 
vendor’s problem is given by: 







∂ > 0 for both attributes, we can assume each vendor will use the 
maximum available budget B to produce the attribute bundle proposal.  The first order 
necessary conditions for an optimum are given by: 
 ( )




i i i ia w c aλ ′∂∂ = + =                              (4a) 
 ( )




i i i ia w c aλ ′∂∂ = + =                             (4b) 
( ) ( )1 1 2 2 0iiL i i i iB c a c aλ∂∂ = − − = ,                        (4c) 
 
where 4(c) simply asserts that the entire budget is being used.  Solving (4a) and (4b) yields: 
( ) ( )
1 2
1 1 2 2
i i
i i i i
w w
c a c a
′ ′= ,                                  (5) 
 
meaning each vendor should choose a bid that uses the entire budget, and for which the 
two attributes have equal ratios between the (subjective) belief of the weight placed on the 
attribute by the buyer, and the vendor’s private marginal costs7.  The solicitation for bids 
results in two vendor offers ( )11 12,a a  and ( )21 22,a a  for the buyer to evaluate. The buyer 
simply selects the vendor whose bid maximizes V.   
In general, ijw  and ijc , are likely to differ between vendors.  Multi-attribute auctions 
allow vendors to differentiate themselves in the auction process and to bid on their 
competitive advantages (Wise and Morrison 2000). 
Multiple Budgets and Expansion Paths 
With the preliminary model in place, the next step is for the buyer to more fully 
explore differences between vendors.  Rather than the buyer specifying a budget B, the 
buyer now specifies a set of (increasing) possible budgets: 1, , kB BK .  Each vendor will go 
through the process described in section 2, k times, and produce a bid satisfying (5) for 
each of the k possible budgets.  This set of bids from a vendor constitutes an “expansion 
path.”  It reveals to the buyer precisely how a vendor’s bid will improve as the budget 
increases. 
                                                
7Note that (5) has a unique solution for each vendor when the entire budget is being used.  Since both cost 
functions are increasing and strictly convex, as we move along the budget constraint curve, one marginal cost is 





For purposes of illustration, it is helpful to consider a particular functional form: 
( ) ij ijaij ij ijc a eβα= , , 0ij ijα β >  for 1, 2i = , 1, 2j = .                    (6) 
 
Note that the functions described by (6) are strictly increasing and convex.  The exponent ijβ  
defines the convexity of each cost function.  Although the insights and conclusions that 
follow do not depend on this particular functional form, it simplifies the analysis to use these 
cost functions throughout the remainder of the paper.  
There are three reasons the expansion paths observed by the buyer might differ 
between vendors: i) the parameters of their cost functions could differ ( ,ij ijα β ), ii) their 
beliefs about the buyer's value function could differ ( ijw ), or iii) both the cost functions and 
the beliefs could differ. 
First, consider the case in which both vendors believe the buyer places equal weight 
on the two attributes, but the vendors differ in their capabilities of producing those attributes.  
Specifically, suppose: 
11 12 11 12 21 22 21 22 11 212.0, 0.6, 1.0, 1.0, 0.7, 0.7w wα α β β α α β β= = = = = = = = = = .      (7) 
 
Note that (7) reflects symmetry between the two attributes in the sense that neither vendor 
“specializes” in producing a particular attribute.  For simplicity, we use cost functions with 
these properties throughout this section, and also to emphasize that asymmetry between 
attributes is not required to realize the benefits of this expansion path approach.  Applying 






Figure 1. Expansion Paths for Two Vendors with Differing Cost Functions as the Budget Increases from 
5 to 30 (the Markers of Increasing Size Show Each Vendor’s Proposal as the Budget Increases in 
Increments of 5) 
Alternatively, vendors could face the same cost functions, but express different 
beliefs about the buyer’s attribute weights.  Specifically, suppose the vendors have the 
following parameter values: 
11 12 21 22 11 12 21 22 11 212.0, 0.6, 0.5, 0.7w wα α α α β β β β= = = = = = = = = = .       (8) 
That is, vendor 2 believes the buyer will place a slightly greater weight on attribute 1, while 
vendor 1 believes the weights on attribute 1 and attribute 2 will be equal.  This results in the 






Figure 2. Expansion Paths for Two Vendors with Differing Beliefs on Attribute Weights as the Budget 
Increases from 5 to 30 (the Markers of Increasing Size Show Each Vendor’s Proposal as the Budget 
Increases in Increments of 5) 
While (7) and (8) are interesting special cases, it is also possible the two vendors will 
differ in both their costs and their beliefs.  Consider two vendors with parameter values: 
11 12 11 12 21 22 21 22 11 212.0, 0.6, 1.0, 1.0, 0.5, 0.7w wα α β β α α β β= = = = = = = = = = .       (9) 






Figure 3. Expansion Paths for Two Vendors with Differing Costs and Beliefs on 
Attribute Weights (the Markers of Increasing Size Show Each Vendor’s 
Proposal as the Budget Increases in Increments of 5) 
For a high budget (e.g., 20), vendor 1 dominates vendor 2.  Regardless of the 
buyer's preferences (provided value is monotonically increasing in each attribute), (s)he will 
select vendor 1.  In a static comparison that assumes a fixed budget of 20, vendor 2 would 
be eliminated from further consideration.  However, if the buyer must proceed knowing that 
a budget cut is possible, a dominated alternative may in fact become the preferred one.  The 
reverse phenomenon can also occur.  Notice in Figure 4 that vendor 2 dominates vendor 1 
at a budget level of 5.  A static comparison assuming a fixed budget of 5 would eliminate 
vendor 1 from further consideration. 
To more clearly illustrate this phenomenon, we first assign attribute weights to the 
buyer's value function.  Let the buyer assign a weight of 0.7 to attribute 1, and 0.3 to 
attribute 2.  Instead of operating as before in attribute space, we now plot the two vendors' 






Figure 4. Value Provided by Each Vendor's Bid for Various Budget Levels 
It is clear from Figure 5 that vendor 2 dominates the competition for any positive 
budget below the switch-point, B<B’, while vendor 1 dominates for any budget above the 
switch-point, B>B’.  This suggests rethinking the typical definition of dominance in the 
literature, a concept routinely used in classroom illustrations and real-world applications to 
eliminate vendors that refers to points (not functions) in cost-effectiveness space.   
In fact, viewing alternative vendors as functions in budget-value space reveals that 
the traditional definition of dominance can be misleading.  For example, consider offers from 
vendor 1 and vendor 2 based on a very optimistic budget above B’.  The traditional 
technique that focuses on points and not functions would likely eliminate vendor 2.  Yet it is 
clear from Figure 5 that eliminating vendor 2 prematurely could lead to a less desirable 
outcome if the budget turned out to be wildly optimistic and the real budget was actually 
somewhere in the range of 0<B<B’. 
     This phenomenon can occur whenever any two vendors’ expansion paths are 
shaped differently, and there is nothing unique about the particular functions chosen in our 
example; they were only selected for ease of exposition.  Moreover, the same result can 
easily occur in the case of non-additive forms of the buyer’s value function, and any non-
linear interactions between attributes is likely to further magnify the effect8.  Our conclusion 
is that this is a basic result that can arise in a wide variety of defense acquisition decision 
environments. Addressing this issue explicitly with this simple new approach could greatly 
benefit both our troops and taxpayers. Given the growing US federal deficit, future budget 
                                                
8For example, consider a multiplicative value function for the buyer, and suppose that one vendor has to incur a 
large cost to provide anything above the minimum level for one particular attribute.  This vendor will offer bids 
of little to no value for low budgets, but depending on cost functions and beliefs, may offer very attractive bids 





challenges may make it imperative for our government, and in particular the Department of 
Defense, to adopt an approach similar to the one proposed in this study. 
Conclusion 
We have described a simple three-stage multi-attribute procurement process for 
defense acquisitions.  It allows the buyer to incorporate preferences over multiple attributes, 
and it allows each vendor to offer their best possible bid based on the budget provided, and 
the vendor's private cost structure and beliefs.  Unlike most current methods, our model 
applies the spirit of CAIV; we do not include costs or any related price attributes in the 
buyer's value function.  Instead, cost enters the model as part of a budget constraint. 
The basic model is easily extended to allow vendors to submit bids for multiple 
potential budget levels.  This leads to the generation of expansion paths for each vendor, 
which illustrates to the buyer precisely how a particular vendor's bid will improve under more 
optimistic budgets or slip under progressive budget cuts.   
Interestingly, it can easily turn out that a vendor whose bid is "dominated" at an 
optimistic budget level is actually the most desirable choice at a more realistic (pessimistic) 
budget level.  As a consequence it is vital for procurement agencies to reset their vendor 
evaluations, and to begin viewing each alternative (vendor) as a curve in budget-value 
space, rather than as a single cost-effectiveness point.  Given future budget realities, this 
expanded view will prevent a vendor from being prematurely eliminated from consideration 
when budgets are likely to change over time. 
The dual fundamental insights of this study are that public procurement decisions 
can be improved if: i) interval estimates (ranges) of future budgets (and corresponding 
probability distributions) are forecasted, and ii) information from vendors is solicited that 
allows procurement alternatives to be defined as a function of value (non-price attributes) 
over a range of possible budgets, rather than as a single point in budget-value (cost-
effectiveness) space. The key implication is that different vendor selection decisions are 
likely to occur under more realistic budget scenarios, and that this can benefit both troops 
and taxpayers.  
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